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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
---0000000---

CATHY JEAN TERRY JENSEN,
Plain tiff-Appellant,
Case No. 18, 312

v.
DAVID KNIGHT JENSEN,
Defendant-Respondent.
---0000000---

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is a divorce action in which the appellant wife
challenges only the custody arrangements entered by the trial judge.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

On November 10, 1980, a short trial was held before the
District Court, the Honorable Thornley K. Swan presiding.

A Decree of

Divorce was entered reserving all issues, including custody, for later
determination.

(R. at 28-29.)

On August 3, 1981, a trial was held

before the District Court, the Honorable Douglas L. Corna by presiding.
Support, property distribution, and custody and visitation arrangements
were entered.

(R. at 77-80.)

Thereafter, the appellant wife moved the

1
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trial court to reconsider the custody and visitation arrangements, which
the court did, modifying its original visitation schedule.
75-76.)

(R. at

Custody of the youngest child, Alisha, was awarded to the

appellant mother; whereas, custody of the older child, Amber, was
awarded to respondent father. (Id.)

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Defendant-respondent David K. Jensen, respectfully requests
that this Court affirm the custody and visitation arrangements fashioned
by the trial court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Defendant-respondent David K. Jensen (hereinafter
"Mr. Jensen") deems it necessary to present a concise statement of the
facts of this case since the statement presented by plaintiff-appellant
Cathy Jean Terry Jensen (hereinafter "Mrs. Jensen") fails to reflect
accurately all of the relevant facts and circumstances at issue.
Ur. and Mrs. Jensen were married on Decenber 17, 1976.
(Tr. at 58.)

The parties have two daughters, Amber Nichole Jensen

(hereinafter ''Amber") and Alisha Dawn Jensen (hereinafter "Alisha").
Amber is now approximately five years of age and Alisha is now approximately is now approximately three and one-half years of age.

During the

pendency of the action, custody of both Amber and Alisha was temporarily

2
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with

~.1rs.

counsel.

Jensen by the stipulation of the parties and their original
( R. at 6-8.)
A divergence of personal values between the parties led to the

deterioration of the marriage.

~.1 rs.

Jen sen liked to "socialize" (Tr. at

93-97); occasionally drank alcoholic beverages (Tr. at 81 and 94-95);
and formed a close relationship with a male neighbor (Tr. at 101-01).
Mr. Jensen disapproved of these activities; was perhaps overly
protective of

~.1rs.

Jensen (Tr. at 14); and placed a higher degree of

importance on religion and family values than did she (Tr. at 99).
Called as a witness for Mr. Jensen, the Honorable J. Duffy
Palmer testified that he had known

~.1r.

Jensen for all of his life

(Tr. at 3); that Mr. Jensen had a great deal of love for his children
(Tr. at 6); and that Mr. Jensen was a very fit parent (Id.).

Judge

Palmer also testified that he had observed that, on occasion, when
Mr. Jensen had picked up the children from ?.1rs. Jensen for visitation
during the pendency of the action (while they were in her custody), the
children were bruised and not in an acceptable state of cleanliness.
(Tr. at 6.)

Judge Palmer noted that the condition of the children when

picked up from Mrs. Jesnen was "really pretty bad".

(Tr. at 8.)

At trial, a neighbor testified that Mrs. Jensen's care of the
children while they were in her custody was less than exemplary.

It was

noted that the two young girls (then approximately one- and two-years of

3
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age) were left home alone at night, with ?.1rs. Jensen not returning until
as late as 2:00 a.m.

(Tr. at 79.)

On occasion,

~.1rs.

Jensen also left

the children in soiled diapers for as long as two hours.
An incident during a boating trip was noted in which

(Tr. at 80.)

~.1rs.

Jensen had

lowered the pants of her swimsuit so as to display her derriere to a
male neighbor within viewing distance of her daughters.

(Tr. at 76-77.)

There was also testimony that Mrs. Jensen used vile and obscene language
in front of the children (Tr. at 101) and that she had, in fact, made
efforts to teach Amber to use such language in referring to her father
(Tr. at 102).

The neighbor also testified without contradiction that

Mrs. Jensen had spoken with her shortly before the trial had commenced
and stated that if her testimony were to be unfavorable, facts that the
witness had earlier disclosed to Mrs. Jensen in confidence would be
related to the witness's husband.

(Tr. at 77.)

There was much testiG'lony during the course of the trial as to
the extent and propriety of a relationship which had developed between
Mrs. Jensen and a male neighbor.

The district court found this testi-

mony credible, noting in his ruling from the bench that she had engaged
in "some inappropriate relationships".

(Ruling at 3.)

There was also

testimony that Mr. Jensen questioned whether the younger child, Alisha,
was in fact his.

(Tr. at 107.)

The court was presented with two expert custody evaluations.
The first was an independent evaluation prepared for the court by

4
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D. Steven Clark, a professional social worker with Social Services.
(R. at 24.)

The second was offered by William McVaugh, who was hired by

Mrs. Jensen after she learned that the report prepared by Social
Services was adverse to her.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit "G", R. at 43.)

The Social Services evaluation unqualifiedly recommended that
custody of both children be placed with Mr. Jensen in the event that the
court should find that "an illicit relationship" had existed between
Mrs. Jensen and the male neighbor.

Moreover, it was noted that even if

the trial court were to be "unsure of her relationship with other
males", the evaluator "would still be very concerned about having the
children placed in her custody."
that

~·.1rs.

(R. at 24.)

Steven Clark also noted

Jensen tended to place the children's needs "secondary to her

own social needs."

(Id.)

The evaluator even went so far as to

recommend that Mrs. Jensen be allowed visitation only during daylight
hours as he was "concerned about her social needs in the evening."
(Id.)

The trial court indicated that he had read and considered the

Social Services recommendation.

(Tr. at 118.)

The only professional recommendation that custody be placed
with Mrs. Jensen was the opinion of William

~.icVaugh.

He had been

retained by :'.1rs. Jensen and, more importantly, admitted not only that he
had made no evaluation whatsoever of t.1r. Jensen (Tr. at 38) but also
that an evaluation of Mr. Jensen would have been helpful (Tr. at 43).
The basis of his opinion was that, when asked to draw a picture of her

5

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

family, Amber had included a character representing her mother and then
asked whether her father should be included also, as 'he isn't living
with us'.

(Tr. at 33.)

It appears that no consideration was made of

the fact that, at the time of his interview with Amber, she had been in
the temporary custody of l\1rs. Jensen for several months.
Based upon all of the evidence before him, the trial court
ruled that !.Irs. Jensen should have custody of the younger child, Alisha;
and that Mr. Jensen should have custody of the older child, Amber.

The

trial court's original visitation schedule provided that the ·children
should. be exchanged for one month during the summer and on weekends.
Immediately following the trial,

~.1rs.

resides in Carson City, Nevada.
with

~'.1rs.

Jensen moved from Utah and now

(Tr. of 12/8/81 Hearing at 3.)

Faced

Jensen's decision to separate herself geographically from

Utah, and in order to afford the children more time together, the trial
court modified the visitation arrangements, providing that both children
should be together for two months each sumner (one month with each
parent) and that visitation be freely granted whenever
to come within the state of Utah.

~\1rs.

Jensen chose

(Id. at 11-12.)

Both the expert witness hired by Mrs. Jen sen and the district
court pleaded with the parties to cease their hostilities or at least
shield the children from them.

(Exhibit G at p. 4 and R. at 63.)

Nevertheless, this appeal ensued.
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6

ARGUMENT

POINT I.

THE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED CUSTODY AWARD

OF THE TRIAL COURT IS PRESUMED PROPER AND SHOULD NOT BE
MODIFIED ABSENT A CLEAR SHOWING BY THE APPELLANT THAT THE
TRIAL COURT ABUSED HIS DISCRETION OR WAS MISTAKEN AS TO THE
APPLICABLE LAW.

It is apparent both from her Brief and from her ex parte
letter to Judge Cornaby (R. at 59) that Mrs. Jensen is not pleased with
the custody award.

However, the fact that one of the ·parties to a

divorce proceeding is dissatisfied with the trial court's ruling is not
indicative either of the propriety or of the merit of the ruling.

Such

remonstrances are not unusual in the aftermath of the inherently
emotional and psychologically traumatic divorce process.
dissatisfied of the outcome of the trial and hearings,

Being

~.1rs.

Jensen now

seeks to commence anew those proceedings.
This Court has, on innumerable occasions, held that while a
divorce action is equitable in nature, the ruling of the trial judge is
favored with a presumption of propriety and accuracy.

It is only in

those few instances in which the appellant can clearly demonstrate a
manifest abuse of discretion or misapplication of law that the decree
fashioned by the trial judge will be disturbed.

Such a position is

logically grounded upon the advantaged position of the trial court, who
has observed the witnesses, heard the testimony, and become acquainted

7
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at least to a limited degree with the parties, their problems, and their
properties.
In a tacit recognition of the fact that the custody award
fashioned by Judge Cornaby is supported by substantial credible
evidence, Mrs. Jensen appears to rely upon the equitable nature of
divorce proceedings in her invitation to this Court to revamp the
original custody award.

A similar invitation was refused in Eastman v.

Eastman, 558 P. 2d 514 (Utah 1976), with the observation that:
We have many times stated that even
though proceedings in divorce cases are
equitable, in which this Court may review
the evidence, due to the prerogatives and
advantaged position of the trial court,
we give considerable deference to his
findings and judgment; and we do not
disturb them unless the evidence clearly
preponderates to the contrary, or he has
abused his discretion,
or misapplied
prin ci ples of law •
558 P.2d at 516 (footnote citations omitted).

It is, therefore,

incumbent upon the appellant in a divorce case to demonstrate some clear
abuse of discretion or misapplication of law before this Court will act
to revise any aspect of the original decree.
This Court has long held that its inherent power to supplant
the trial judge's discretion is to be exercised only judiciously and
infrequently.

For example, in Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2d

977 (1956), it was held that:

8
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The more recent pronouncements of this
court, and the policy to which we adhere,
are to the effect that the trial judge
has considerable latitude of discretion
in such matters and that his judgment
should not be changed lightly, and in
fact, not at all, unless it works such a
manifest injustice or inequity as to
indicate a clear abuse of discretion.
296 P. 2d at 981 (footnote omitted).
In view of the amount of discretion accorded to the trial
judge and this Court's requirement that a clear abuse of that discretion
or misapplication of law be demonstrated as a condition precedent to any
modification of the trial judge's ruling, the cases have frequently
noted that the mere fact that a majority of the members of the reviewing
court might, themselves, have reached a different ruling than did the
trial court is insufficient to justify any modification of the original
decree.

This Court emphasized this principle in Christensen v.

Christensen, 21 Utah 2d 263, 444 P. 2d 511 ( 1968), noting:
Whether we as individual judges
would or would not have arrived at the
same exact formula as to what (might be]
the most practical and just treatment
• • . of this situation is not the
question on this appeal. Even though it
is the established rule that divorce
cases being in equity, it is the duty of
this court to review and weigh the
evidence, it is equally true that we have
invariably recognized the advantaged
position of the trial judge and given
deference to his findings and judgment,
declaring that they should not be upset
unless the evidence clearly preponderates

9
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against them, or unless the decree works
such an injustice that equity and good
conscience demand that it be revised. An
important consideration in this regard is
"the
elimination
or
minimization
of
frictions
or
difficulties
in
the
future" • • • .
444 P. 2d at 512-13 (emphasis added, footnote omitted).
These sound principles of review in divorce cases were
recently reaffirmed by this Court in Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P. 2d 1218
(Utah 1980).

In that case, this Court reiterated:
In a divorce case, even though the
proceedings are equitable and this Court
may review the evidence, this Court
accords considerable deference to the
findings and judgment of the trial court
due to its advantageous position.
On
appeal this Court will not disturb the
action of the trial court unless the
evidence clearly preponderates to the
contrary, or the trial court has abused
its discretion or misapplied principles
of law. In application of these precepts
to the record herein there is no basis to
interfere with the decision of the trial
court.

615 P. 2d at 1222 (footnotes omitted).
Under the standards of review traditionally applied by this
Court, the custody award entered in this case is presumed valid and will
be affirmed unless Mrs. Jensen has demonstrated that Judge Cornaby has
so clearly abused his discretion as to result in substantial prejudice
or has misapplied the relevant law in this case to such a degree that
the decree entered is manifestly unfair and inequitable.

10
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POINT li.

APPELLANT HAS ENTIRELY FAILED TO MEET

HER BURDEN OF DEMONSTRATING SOME ABUSE OF DISCRETION
OR MISAPPLICATION OF LAW; THEREFORE, THE CUSTODY AWARD
SHOULD BE AFFIRMED.

Although appellant's Brief makes clear

~.1rs.

Jensen's

subjective dissatisfaction with the custody award entered by Judge
Cornaby, it wholly fails to delineate a single instance in which the
trial court either abused its discretion or misapplied the relevant law
of this state.
~.1rs ..

Jensen first claims that "the only professional

evaluation" with respect to custody recommended that custody of both
Amber and Alisha be awarded to her.

(App. Br. at 6.)

That is not true.

Although William MacVaugh recommended that Urs. Jensen--by whom he had
been hired--be awarded custody of the children, the independent custody
evaluation of D. Steven Clark strongly recommended that custody of both
children be placed with

~.1r.

Jensen.

(R. at 24.)

As noted in the

Statement of Facts, the evidence adduced at the trial supports the
concern of the Social Services evaluator that Mrs. Jensen places the
welfare of the children second to her "social needs".
Appellant next relies in her Brief upon this Court's decision
in Wiese v. Wiese, 24 Utah 2d 236, 469 P.2d 504 (1970).

She presents a

"quotation" from that decision (App. Br. at 8); however, the only
language in that "quotation" helpful to her position is not found within

11
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the actual text of the opinion.
at 8.)

(Compare 469 P.2d at 505 with App. Br.

In Wiese, which was a modification proceeding, this Court did

reverse the trial court's refusal to modify custody arrangements.

That

decision, however, was based upon the uncontroverted testimony of two
psychologists (one hired by each party) that the children were developing serious problems under the existing custody arrangements and would
be benefited by a change.

469 P.2d at 507.

The case has little, if

any, applicability to the facts of the present situation.
Similiarly devoid of merit are appellant's references to "the
ancient story of Solomon".

(App. Br. at 9.)

~1oreover,

~.1rs.

Jensen has

apparently failed to read the district court's order (prepared by her
own counsel) modifying the visitation schedules (R. at 75-76) since she
claims (App. Br. at 9-10) that Amber and Alisha will not be together
even during visitation.

As modified, the district Court's visitation

schedule clearly provides for Amber and Alisha to spend two months
together during the summer, one-half with Mrs. Jensen and one-half with
Mr. Jensen.

Had

~11rs.

Jensen not chosen to remove herself to Carson

City, Nevada, Amber and Alisha could similarly have enjoyed each other's
company every weekend.
In short, while :\1rs. Jen sen makes clear her dissatisfaction
with the ruling of the district court, she has entirely failed to
demonstrate any abuse of discretion or misapplication of law.

Absent

the demonstration of such errors, the trial court's custody award must
be affirmed.

~.1oreover,

by the time a ruling is entered in this appeal,
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Amber will have lived with her father for almost two years.

As

recognized by this Court in Hogge v. Hogge, --P. 2d-- (Utah June 17,
1982), "the advantage of stability in custody arrangements . • •
weigh[s] against changes in the party awarded custody."

-- P.2d at

•

Having failed to demonstrate any abuse of discretion or
misapplication of law by the district court,

~.1rs.

Jensen's request that

the custody award fashioned by the trial court be modified must be
rejected.

P-OINT tu.

THE MERE FACT THAT CUSTODY OF THE TWO

CHILDREN WAS SPLIT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE ERROR.

In her Brief, Mrs. Jensen complains not that the trial court
erred in awarding custody of either child to r-.-Ir. Jensen, but that
custody of the two children was split.

This Court has recognized that

the custody of siblings may, on occasion, have to be split.
For example, in Jorgensen v. Jorgensen, 599 P.2d 510 (Utah
1979), two children were born as issue of the marriage and each parent
was awarded the custody of one child.

As in the present case, the

mother appealed, challenging the award and arguing that custody of both
children should have been awarded to her.

This Court affirmed the split

custody award fashioned by the trial court, notwithstanding its
recognition of the "judicial preference" for the mother in child custody

13
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matters when all other considerations are balanced.

In so holding, this

Court observed:
[The mother] is mistaken • • • in
asserting that this preference entitled
her to custody of both children in the
present case. Pointing to the fact that
the trial court made no finding that she
was unfit as a mother, plaintiff asserts
that the judicial policy entitles her to
custody of the children as a matter of
law. In fact, the preference operates to
give custody to the mother all other
things being equal. S-uch a preference is
a creature of judicial policy, however,
it must yield to the legislative mandate
that the best interests of the child be
given primary consideration. Whenever,
pursuant to a consideration of such
interests, any circunstances in a case
preponderate in favor of the husband, all
things are not equal.
We should note, also, that the
trial court is given particularly broad
discretion in the area of ·child custody
incident
to
separation
or
divorce
proceedings.
A determination of the
"best interests of the child" frequently
turns on numerous factors which the trial
court is best suited to assess, given its
proximity
to
the
parties
and
the
circumstances.
Only where trial court
action is so flagrantly unjust as to
constitute an abuse of discretion should
the appellate form interpose its own
judgment.
599 P. 2d at 511-12 (footnote omitted, original emphasis).

In language

as applicable to the present case as to the matter then under
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consideration, this Court went on to inventory and assess the factors
justifying the trial court's split custody award:
Testimony at trial bore out the court's
finding that [the mother] was at the time
of trial, and had been for a period of a
year prior thereto, living with and
carrying on an extra-marital relationship
with another man, that such was the
second such relationship to arise in the
course of the five-year marriage; that
[the
mother's]
present
income
was
minimal; that the [father] is res ponsible, has adequate employment, enjoys a
particularly close relationship with his
son, and· is in all respects competent to
care for him.
Thus, while the court
conceded that "both parties could qualify
as proper persons to be awarded custody
of [the children] , the evidence as a
whole preponderates in favor of the
[father] for custody of his minor son."
As indicated above, the law requires no
more than such a preponderance. While it
is true that a child custody award which
keeps all the children of a marriage
united is generally preferred to one
which divides them between the parents,
that preference is not binding in the
face
of
considerations
dictating
a
contrary course of action.
599 P. 2d at 512.

In the present case, the trial court's decision to

award custody of Amber (who is now approximately five years of age) to
the father was well justified.

Faced with a particularly difficult and

onerous decision, the wisdom of the trial court--who had a first-hand
opportunity to observe the parties and their witnesses--should not be
disturbed.

15
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Likewise, in Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1980),
this Court affirmed the trial court's decision to split custody of the
parties' six children, with the three younger children being awarded to
the mother and the three older children being awarded to the father.

In

so holding, this Court noted :
This Court will not upset the trial
court's judgment in custodial matters
unless it is persuasively shown to be
contrary to the best interests and
welfare of the children and family.
615 P. 2d at 1224 (footnote omitted).

The custody award in the present

action should likewise be affirmed even though the trial court found
that, in the children's best interests, it was necessary to divide their
custody between the parties.

CONCLUSION

The only issue in this appeal relates to the custody of the
parties' two daughters, Amber and Alisha.

Particularly with respect to

matters relating to custody, this Court has consistently adhered to the
precept that the trial court's judgment will not be set aside unless the
appellant clearly demonstrates that the trial court has abused its
discretion or misapplied relevant law.

~.1rs.

Jensen has made no such

showing in the present case.
Faced with substantial testimony of less than exemplary and
even inappropriate conduct by Mrs. Jensen, an independent custody
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evaluation strongly recommending that custody of both children be placed
with Mr. Jensen, and the fact that Mr. Jensen himself questioned whether
he was the father of Alisha, the trial court displayed exemplary wisdom
in awarding custody of Amber to Mr. Jensen and custody of Alisha to
:'.1 rs. Jensen.

Faced with :\1rs. Jensen's decision to leave the state of Utah
immediately after the trial of this action, the trial court has
fashioned the most practical visitation schedule possible for the
children.

They will spend a substantial portion of each summer in each

other's company and will be permitted to spend as much time together
during the rest of the year as Mrs. Jensen's travel plans will permit.
The carefully considered custody award of the district court
should be affirr.1ed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thisBJl day of July, 1982.

DART
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!.1AILING CERTIFICATE

I certify that on this 2._j_ day of July, 1982, I mailed two
copies of the foregoing Brief with postage prepaid to Pete Vlahos,
Vlahos, Perkins
Ogden, Utah

&

Sharp, Legal Forum Building, 2447 Kiesel Avenue,

84401.
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